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We develop a theory of a firm in an incomplete contracts environment which decides on its 
complexity, organization, and global scale. Specifically, the firm decides i) how thinly it 
wants to slice its production process by choosing the mass of symmetric intermediate inputs 
that are simultaneously combined to a final product, ii) if the supplier of each component is an 
external contractor or an integrated affiliate, and iii) if that component is offshored  to a 
foreign country. We also consider the case of asymmetric inputs. Our model leads to a rich set 
of novel predictions about the structure of multinational firms that are consistent with stylized 
facts from the recent empirical literature. 
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Most goods require intermediate inputs, and how thinly the production process for a par-
ticular ﬁnal product is “sliced” is a choice made by ﬁrms. Some choose a setting with
multiple highly specialized suppliers with very narrowly deﬁned tasks, while other ﬁrms
from the same industry rely on a lower division of labor with fewer suppliers who provide
broader inputs. Table 1 illustrates this with an example from the automotive sector: Ford
procures the entire door module for the Fiesta from a single supplier (Faurecia), while
Volkswagen collaborates with nine diﬀerent suppliers who manufacture speciﬁc parts of
the doors for the Golf VI (like the handle and the hinges) which are then combined in the
ﬁnal assembly of the car. The Volvo XC90 ranges in between, with the door module sliced
up into six parts each of which comes from a diﬀerent supplier.
Table 1: Slicing of the production process in car manufacturing - an example
Ford Fiesta Volvo XC90 Volkswagen Golf VI
modules (Faurecia) window regulators (Brose) carcase modules (Arvin Meritor, Brose)
lockset (HuF) control units (Brose)
glazing (Pilkington) brackets (Brose, Röchling Automotive)
seals (Cooper) panels (Röchling Automotive)
lock seals (Polymere) side panels (Peguform)
hinges (Edscha) attaching parts for panels (Polytec Group)
foam ﬁlm side armrest (Benecke-Kaliko)
hinges (Edscha, ISE Automotive)
outside handles (Witte Automotive)
Enquiry based on: Faurecia (2011), Automobil-Produktion (2008), Sako (2005), Automotive News (2002)
For each component of the ﬁnal product, a ﬁrm then needs to decide whether to obtain it
from a supplier who is integrated into the ﬁrm’s boundaries, or to outsource it to an external
contractor. As is well known since Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990),
these organizational decisions (“make or buy”) matter in an environment with incomplete
contracts, as they aﬀect the suppliers’ incentives to make relationship-speciﬁc investments.
Finally, in a globalized world, ﬁrms also need to decide on the international scale of their
sourcing strategy. Some source only domestically, while others collaborate with foreign
suppliers either at arm’s length or through intra-ﬁrm trade (Grossman and Helpman, 2002).
An example that illustrates those dimensions is the “Swedish” Volvo S40. A substantial
2share of the inputs for this car is produced by independent foreign suppliers (e.g., the
navigation control by Japanese, the side mirror and fuel tank by German, the headlights
by American contractors, etc.), while the airbag and the seats are outsourced domestically
within Sweden. Yet other inputs are manufactured inhouse. Of those tasks, some are
performed within the Swedish parent plants, while other components are manufactured by
foreign subsidiaries of Volvo.1
In this paper, we develop a theory of a ﬁrm which decides on the complexity, the orga-
nization, and the global scale of its production process. We build on the seminal approach
by Antràs and Helpman (2004), who were the ﬁrst to study global sourcing decisions under
incomplete contracts. Their model is restricted to a setting with a headquarter and one
single supplier. We consider multiple suppliers. Our model leads to a rich set of novel
predictions about the structure of multinational enterprises (MNEs) that are consistent
with stylized facts from the recent empirical literature.
We ﬁrst consider a scenario where the headquarter (the “producer”) decides on the mass
of diﬀerentiated but symmetric intermediate inputs that are simultaneously combined to a
ﬁnal product. Each input is provided by a separate supplier. We refer to this endogenous
mass of inputs, which is equivalent to the mass of suppliers that the ﬁrm deals with, as
the level of complexity of the production process.2 The more suppliers there are, the more
specialized is the task that every single supplier performs. Similar as in Acemoglu et al.
(2007), this specialization leads to eﬃciency gains, but it also necessitates contracting with
more parties. As we show below, this dilutes the investment incentives of every single
supplier, and it endogenously leads to higher ﬁxed costs for the ﬁrm. The producer fur-
thermore decides, separately for each component, if the respective supplier is an external
contractor or an integrated aﬃliate, and if it is oﬀshored to a (low-cost) foreign country.
Afterwards, we turn to a related scenario where the producer contracts with a given num-
ber of two suppliers who provide asymmetric components that may diﬀer in their input
intensities, unit costs, and their degree of “sophistication”.
1See Baldwin (2009) for a further discussion of this example. Other cases include Nike, which relies
heavily on foreign outsourcing, or Intel which mainly engages in vertical foreign direct investment (FDI),
see Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg (2009).
2In this terminology, the making of the doors for the Golf VI is a more complex production process
than for the Ford Fiesta, because it involves more and more specialized suppliers (see Table 1). We
should emphasize that we consider horizontal slicing, i.e., the components enter simultaneously into the
production process. We do not consider a sequential setup as in Antràs and Chor (2011) or Costinot et
al. (2011) with subsequent stages where intermediate inputs are added and the ﬁnal product is reﬁned in
each stage. Relatedly, we also do not consider possible sourcing decisions of suppliers. That is, we are not
interested in whether component manufacturers like Faurecia rely themselves on intermediate inputs, but
we focus on the ﬁrm structure of the ﬁnal goods producer.
3Our model ﬁrstly predicts that ﬁrms diﬀer in the complexity of their production pro-
cesses, both within and across industries. Higher productivity and lower headquarter-
intensity tend to increase the mass of suppliers that a ﬁrm chooses to contract with.
Second, ﬁrms may outsource some of their suppliers but vertically integrate others. This
“hybrid” sourcing mode is prevalent in ﬁrms with medium-to-high productivity from sectors
with low-to-medium headquarter-intensity.3 Third, ﬁrms may decide to oﬀshore only some
components, and this oﬀshoring share tends to be higher in more productive ﬁrms and in
less headquarter-intensive industries. Importantly, the possibility to engage in oﬀshoring
boosts the slicing of the production process, and it is positively correlated with outsourcing.
That is, the same ﬁrm chooses more suppliers and a higher outsourcing share in an open
economy than in a closed economy context. Finally, the model with two asymmetric inputs
predicts that the supplier who provides the component with the higher input intensity and
the lower unit costs tends to be outsourced, while the supplier with the more sophisticated
input which requires more speciﬁc knowledge is likely to be kept within ﬁrm boundaries.
The predictions of our model are then discussed in the light of the recent empirical
literature on multinational ﬁrms. That literature has started to carefully explore the
internal structure of MNEs, and also to test particular aspects of the baseline model by
Antràs and Helpman (2004). Several predictions are supported by the empirical evidence.4
Other features of the data are harder to understand with this baseline framework, however,
or with other theoretical models about the structure of MNEs. For example, Kohler and
Smolka (2009), Jabbour (2008) and Jabbour and Kneller (2010) show that most MNEs
collaborate with many suppliers and often choose diﬀerent sourcing modes for diﬀerent
inputs – as in the Volvo S40 example discussed above. In particular, Tomiura (2007) ﬁnds
that ﬁrms which outsource some suppliers while keeping others integrated tend to be more
productive than ﬁrms which rely on a single sourcing mode in the global economy.
3Du, Lu and Tao (2009) consider an extension of Antràs and Helpman (2004) where the same input
can be provided by two suppliers. “Bi-sourcing” (one supplier integrated and the other outsourced) can
arise in their model out of a strategic motive, because it systematically improves the headquarter’s outside
option and thus its bargaining power. In our model there is an endogenous mass of suppliers who provide
diﬀerentiated inputs, and our hybrid sourcing result relies on a diﬀerent, non-strategic motive.
4Consistent with Antràs and Helpman (2004), the study by Nunn and Treﬂer (2008) ﬁnds that intra-
ﬁrm trade is most pervasive for highly productive ﬁrms in headquarter-intensive sectors, and Defever and
Toubal (2007) ﬁnd that highly productive ﬁrms tend to choose foreign outsourcing for components with
high input intensity. Consistent with the extension in Antràs and Helpman (2008), who consider partial
contractibility and cross-country diﬀerences in contracting institutions, the study by Corcos et al. (2009)
ﬁnds that ﬁrms are more likely to oﬀshore in countries with good contracting institutions, and Bernard et
al. (2010) report that institutional improvements favor foreign outsourcing. The studies by Feenstra and
Hanson (2005), Yeaple (2006), Marin (2006), and Federico (2010), among others, are also concerned with
the internal structure of MNEs and obtain empirical ﬁndings broadly in line with those baseline models.
4Our framework is able to account for those stylized facts, since it allows for multiple
suppliers. It also delivers new and empirically relevant results compared to Acemoglu et
al. (2007) who focus on a closed economy setting. In particular, although they study the
organizational structure of ﬁrms with an endogenous mass of intermediate inputs, they
do not allow for sectoral diﬀerences in headquarter-intensity and cannot generate “hybrid
sourcing” where a ﬁrm has some integrated and some outsourced suppliers. Turning to the
global scale dimension, the framework by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) predicts
quite naturally that ﬁrms may oﬀshore only some but not all inputs. Yet, that approach
neglects the repercussions with the complexity and organization decisions that we empha-
size in our model. Finally, Alfaro and Charlton (2009) show that ﬁrms tend to outsource
low-skill inputs from the early stages, while keeping high-skill inputs from the ﬁnal stages
of the production process inside the ﬁrm boundaries. Corcos et al. (2009) consistently ﬁnd
that inputs with a higher degree of speciﬁcity are less likely to be outsourced. Our model
with two asymmetric inputs is consistent with those facts as it predicts that ﬁrms tend to
keep the more sophisticated input inhouse.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic structure
of our model. Section 3 is devoted to the scenario with an endogenous mass of symmetric
components, while Section 4 looks at the case with two asymmetric inputs. In Section 5
we conclude and contrast the predictions of our model with stylized facts, and we discuss
further testable predictions in order to motivate future empirical research.
2 Model
2.1 Demand and technology
We consider a ﬁrm that produces a ﬁnal good y for which it faces the following iso-elastic
demand function:
y = Y  p
1=( 1): (1)
The variable p denotes the price of this good, and Y > 1 is a demand shifter. The demand
elasticity is given by 1=(1 ) and is increasing in the parameter  2 (0;1). Producing this
good requires headquarter services and manufacturing components, which are combined
according to the following Cobb-Douglas production function:











5where  > 0 is a productivity shifter; the larger  is, the more productive is the ﬁrm.
Headquarter services are denoted by h and are provided by the “producer”. The parameter
H 2 (0;1) is the headquarter-intensity, so that M = 1   H is the overall component-
intensity of production. This parameter H is exogenously given and reﬂects the technology
of the sector in which the ﬁrm operates.5
There is a continuum of manufacturing components, with measure N 2 R+. Each
component is provided by a separate supplier. The supplier i 2 [0;N] delivers mi units
of its particular input, and the aggregate component input M is given by the following












The parameter  2 (0;1) determines the degree of substitutability of the single components,
and the elasticity of substitution, 1=(1 ), is always above unity. The parameter i reﬂects
the intensity of component i within the aggregate M, with
R N
0 jdj = 1.6 Using equations















The producer decides on the structure of the ﬁrm, and this choice involves three aspects:
i) complexity, ii) organization, and iii) global scale of production. Complexity refers to
the mass of components that simultaneously combined in the production process. If the
producer chooses “low” complexity, she relies on a setting with relatively few and broad
components with a high average input intensity. An increase in complexity lowers the av-
erage input intensity across the single components at constant overall component-intensity
M. The inputs then become more specialized. To give an example, a car producer may
choose to obtain the complete coachwork from a single supplier, or she may choose to
obtain diﬀerent parts of it (like the doors and the hood) from diﬀerent suppliers.
5For example, M is higher in the automobile than, say, in the software industry. The headquarter
services thus account for a ﬁxed share H of total value added and necessarily have to be performed by
the producer herself, i.e., they cannot be unbundled, outsourced or oﬀshored.
6If all components are symmetric, as will be assumed in Section 3, then i = 1=N. Each component
then has an individual input intensity equal to M  i = (1   H)=N.
6Secondly, turning to the organizational decision, the producer decides separately for
each of those components if the respective supplier is integrated as a subsidiary within the
boundaries of the ﬁrm, or if that component is outsourced to an external supplier. The
crucial assumption is that the investments for all inputs are not contractible, as in Antràs
and Helpman (2004). This may be due to the fact that the precise characteristics of the
inputs are diﬃcult to specify ex ante and also diﬃcult to verify ex post. As a result of this
contract incompleteness, the producer and the suppliers end up in a bargaining situation,
at a time when their input investment costs are already sunk. Following the property rights
approach of the ﬁrm, see Grossman and Hart (1986) or Hart and Moore (1990), we assume
that bargaining also takes place within the boundaries of the ﬁrm in the case of vertical
integration. The bargaining power of the involved parties depends crucially on the ﬁrm
structure as will be explained below.
Finally, the producer decides on the location where each component is manufactured.
The headquarter itself is located in a high-wage country 1, where ﬁnal assembly of good y is
carried out. Both under outsourcing and vertical integration, the respective input suppliers
may either also come from country 1, or from a foreign low-wage country 2. There is an
arm’s length relationship if the producer outsources a component to a foreign contractor,
and intra-ﬁrm trade (vertical FDI) if a foreign supplier is vertically integrated.
2.3 Structure of the game
We consider a game that consists of ﬁve stages. The timing of events is as follows:
1. The producer simultaneously decides on: i) the complexity, ii) the organization, and
iii) the global scale of the production process. In particular, i) she chooses the mass N
of manufacturing components. ii) For each i 2 [0;N] she chooses the organizational
form i 2 fO;V g. Here, i = O denotes “outsourcing” and i = V denotes “vertical
integration” of supplier i. We order the mass N such that each supplier j 2 [0;NO] is
outsourced, and each supplier k 2 (NO;N] is vertically integrated. Then,  = NO=N
(with 0    1) denotes the outsourcing share, and (1   ) = NV=N is the share
of vertically integrated suppliers/components. Finally, iii) for each i 2 [0;N] the
producer decides on the country r = f1;2g where that component is manufactured.
We order the mass of outsourced suppliers NO such that each supplier j 2 [0;NO
2 ]
is oﬀshored to the low-wage country 2, and each supplier k 2 (NO
2 ;NO] is located in
the high-wage country 1. Then, `O = NO
2 =NO denotes the oﬀshoring share among all
7outsourced suppliers (with 0  `O  1). Similarly, `V = NV
2 =NV (with 0  `V  1)
is the oﬀshoring share among all integrated suppliers, and the total oﬀshoring share
of the ﬁrm is given by ` =   `O + (1   )  `V.
2. Given the ﬁrm structure decisions fN;;`O;`Vg, the producer oﬀers a contract to
potential input suppliers for every component i 2 [0;N]. This contract includes an
upfront payment i (positive or negative) to be paid by the prospective supplier.
3. There exists a large pool of potential applicant suppliers for each manufacturing
component in both countries. These suppliers have an outside opportunity equal to
wM
r in country r = f1;2g. They are willing to accept the contract if their payoﬀ is
at least equal to wM
r . The payoﬀ consists of the upfront payment i and the revenue
share i that supplier i anticipates to receive at the bargaining stage, minus the
investment costs (which may diﬀer across applicants). Potential suppliers apply for
the contract, and the producer chooses one supplier for each component i 2 [0;N].
4. The producer and the suppliers independently decide on their non-contractible input
levels for the headquarter service (h) and the components (mi), respectively.
5. Output is produced and revenue is realized according to (2), (3), and (4). The surplus
value is divided between the producer and the suppliers.
Starting with stage 5, the surplus value that has to be divided among the N +1 agents
is the total revenue R as given in (4). With i we denote the revenue share of component
supplier i, and M =
R N
0 jdj is the joint revenue share of all component suppliers. The
revenue share realized by the producer is written as H, and we have H + M = 1. We
study two diﬀerent scenarios how the surplus value is divided. First, there is a benchmark
scenario where the producer is able to freely decide on the division of revenue (see Section
3.1.1.). Notice that this free division of the surplus does not resolve the hold-up and hence
the underinvestment problem inherent in this game structure. In the second scenario (see
Section 3.1.2.) we follow Grossman and Hart (1986) and Antràs and Helpman (2004)
and assume that the producer cannot freely specify the division of revenue. She rather
has to decide on the structure of the ﬁrm in order to aﬀect the revenue distribution, as
this pins down the bargaining power of the involved agents. In that scenario we assume
a simultaneous multilateral bargaining setting and use the Shapley value as the solution
concept, similar as in Acemoglu et al. (2007) or in Hart and Moore (1990). The details of
the revenue division are analyzed later.
8In stage 4, anticipating i, each component supplier i 2 [0;N] chooses mi so as to
maximize iR cM
i;rmi, where cM
i;r denotes the unit cost level of the supplier for component
i that the producer has oﬀered the contract. The producer chooses h in order to maximize
HR cHh, where cH denotes the unit cost of providing headquarter services. We show in
Appendix A.1. that the agents choose the following levels of input provision:
























  R: (5)



























where   Y ()
=(1 ) is an alternative productivity measure. Everything else equal, h is
increasing in H. An increase of H lowers the remaining share M that can be distributed
among the suppliers, however, and thereby tends to exacerbate their underinvestment
problems. The producer thus faces a trade-oﬀ between revenue share and level.
Next, in order to receive applications for each desired component input in stage 3, the
producer must oﬀer contracts in stage 2 that satisfy the suppliers’ participation constraints.
For supplier i this implies that the payoﬀ from forming the relationship, given (5) and (6),
must at least match the outside opportunity:
iR   c
M
i;rmi + i  w
M
r : (7)
In stage 1, the producer then chooses the structure of the ﬁrm so as to maximize her
individual payoﬀ, HR cHh 
R N
0 jdj, subject to the incentive compatibility constraints
(5) and (6), and the participation constraints (7). Since the producer can freely adjust
the upfront payments i, these participation constraints are satisﬁed with equality for
all suppliers i 2 [0;N]. Rearranging i = wM
i;r   iR + cM
i;rmi, substituting this into the
individual payoﬀ of the producer, and recalling that M = 1   H, it follows that the
producer’s problem is equivalent to maximizing the total payoﬀ for all N + 1 involved
parties, i.e.:  = R  cHh 
R N
0 cM
j;rmjdj  F, where h, mj and R are given in (5) and (6).
The term F denotes the “ﬁxed costs” of production, which consist of an exogenous overhead




Notice that F is increasing in N as long as wM
j;r > 0, i.e., the participation constraints
generate a ﬁxed cost that is endogenously increasing in complexity, as this necessitates
contracting with more suppliers.
3 Symmetric components
In this section we consider the case of symmetric components. We ﬁrst abstract from the
global scale dimension, and focus on the complexity and organization decisions when all
suppliers are located in country 1.
3.1 Closed economy
When all components that are part of the production process are technologically equally
important, we have i = 1=N so that the individual input intensity of each component is
given by M  i =
 
1   H
=N. Furthermore, all suppliers have the same unit costs and
the same outside opportunities, cM
i = cM and wM
i;1 = wM
1 for all i 2 [0;N].
Notice that an increase in the complexity level N is associated with a uniform reduction
in the individual input intensities of all suppliers. Economically, if the producer chooses to
collaborate with more suppliers, each individual supplier performs a more narrowly deﬁned
task. We assume that this specialization leads to eﬃciency gains, similar as in Acemoglu
et al. (2007). Speciﬁcally, we assume that the unit costs for the suppliers are described by
c
M = c  N
 s; with s 2 (0;1):
The cost savings from specialization are thus more substantial the larger s is. Without
loss of generality, we normalize the parameter c to unity (c = 1).
3.1.1 Optimal mass of suppliers and revenue division
We now ﬁrst study the benchmark scenario where the producer can freely decide on the
division of revenue subject to H + M = 1. In that case, each supplier receives a revenue
share i = (1 H)=N due to symmetry. The resulting input provision levels from (5) and
(6) simplify and now read as































Finally, the ﬁrm’s total payoﬀ given (8) and (9) is  = R   cHh   cMNm   F =
	   NwM



















a) Zero outside opportunity. When setting the suppliers’ outside opportunities to zero
(wM
1 = 0), the producer’s problem is equivalent to maximizing the variable payoﬀ as given
in (10) simultaneously with respect to N and H. We can derive the following unique































s(1   H)(1   H)(4H + s(1   H)(1   H)). We have 0 < H
0 < 1 and
N
0 > 0 for all f;H;sg 2 (0;1). Using (11) and (12) we can state
Proposition 1: Firms from more headquarter-intensive industries (higher H) have a
lower optimal mass of suppliers N
0 and a higher optimal headquarter revenue share H
0 .
A stronger cost saving eﬀect (higher s) leads to a higher N
0 and to a lower H
0 .
The intuition for the result @H
0 =@H > 0 is similar as in Antràs and Helpman (2004,
2008): due to the hold up problem, both the headquarter and the suppliers underinvest in
the provision of their respective inputs, and this underinvestment problem is more severe
for the headquarter (the mass of suppliers) the smaller (the larger) the revenue share H
7Notice that neither the input levels h and m from (8), nor the ﬁrm’s revenue and payoﬀ from (9) and
(10) depend on the parameter , i.e., on the degree of substitutability across components. This is due to
the fact that the production function in (2) and (3) features no aggregate gains from component variety,
since we have M = N  m with symmetrical inputs.
11is. Ensuring ex ante eﬃciency requires that the producer must receive a larger share of the
surplus in sectors where headquarter services are more intensively used in production.
The basic trade-oﬀ with respect to the complexity choice is novel in our framework. It
can be seen from (10) that the impact of N on 	 is, a priori, ambiguous. Intuitively,
higher complexity leads to stronger specialization (i.e., lower unit costs cM), which tends
to increase the ﬁrm’s revenue and payoﬀ. On the other hand, for a given share H, higher
complexity also “dilutes” the investment incentives for every single supplier, because the
individual input intensities decrease and the overall revenue share M = 1   H has to be
split among more parties. This negatively impacts on the suppliers’ incentives and on the
ﬁrm’s payoﬀ. The optimal choice N
0 balances the “cost saving” and the “dilution” eﬀect.
Why do ﬁrms from more headquarter-intensive industries have a lower optimal mass
of suppliers? The intuition for the result @N
0=@H < 0 is that the optimal joint revenue
share for the suppliers, M = 1   H, is decreasing in H. This jeopardizes the suppli-
ers’ investment incentives. To countervail this problem, the producer can concentrate on
relatively few components with a high individual input intensity. Although the gains from
specialization are smaller in that case, the resulting increases of i and i again raise the
suppliers’ incentives. It is, thus, not clear if the optimal revenue share of a single supplier
(
i0) is increasing or decreasing in H; there is a larger joint revenue share M when H
is low (“component-intensity eﬀect”), but this share is then split among many suppliers
(“complexity eﬀect”). Using (11) and (12), it can be shown that 
i0 = (1   H
0 )=N
0 is
in fact hump-shaped over the range of H (see Appendix A.2.1.ii). In other words, single
suppliers receive the highest revenue shares in sectors with medium headquarter-intensity.
The stronger the cost savings from specialization are, the more proﬁtable is it to add
components to the production process (@N
0=@s > 0). This increase in complexity is
then accompanied by a decrease in the optimal revenue share, since the incentives for all
component manufacturers must be maintained (@H
0 =@s < 0).8 When s becomes very
small, so does N
0. Intuitively, the “cost saving” eﬀect disappears if s tends to zero. The
“dilution eﬀect” for the suppliers is still present, however, so that the optimal mass of
components would then also become very small. Notice that this is true even though
8We show in Appendix A.2.1.iii that N
0 = 1 if s = scrit. Suppose the set of suppliers N is discrete,
by assuming that the mass of inputs on the unit interval [0;1] is provided by a single supplier. In fact, if
s = scrit, choosing a unit mass of inputs is optimal for the producer. The corresponding H
0 (s = scrit)
in that case is identical to eq. (10) in Antràs and Helpman (2004), where it is exogenously imposed that
there is one single manufacturing component provided by a single supplier. Their baseline model is thus
included in our framework as a special case. When s is smaller (larger) than scrit, it is optimal to have
less (more) than a unit mass of inputs.
12contracting with more suppliers leads to no increase in ﬁxed costs as long as wM
1 = 0.
Finally, notice that (11) and (12) for the case of zero outside opportunities do not
depend on . Still, a ﬁrm needs to be suﬃciently productive in order to operate in the
market, since the variable payoﬀ must be large enough to cover the overhead costs  f.
b) Positive outside opportunity. Turning to the case with wM
1 > 0, recall that there
is an additional endogenous “complexity penalty” embedded in our model, since more
suppliers lead to a larger ﬁxed costs N  wM
1 .
With wM
1 > 0, we cannot explicitly solve for N and H. However, using the two ﬁrst-
order conditions for payoﬀ maximization, it is possible to solve @=@H = 0 for H (N)
with @H=@N < 0, which does not depend on wM
1 (see Appendix A.2.2.i). Substituting

















	0 only depends on N (and on parameters) and represents the marginal change in the
total payoﬀ when raising complexity, taking into account that H(N) is optimally adjusted.
We know that 	0 = 0 is solved by N
0 as given in (12). With wM
1 > 0, the optimal mass of
producers N is determined by setting 	0 equal to wM
1 = > 0, and since @	0=@N < 0 it
follows directly that 0 < N < N













Figure 1: Optimal complexity with (N) and without (N
0) increasing ﬁxed costs.
The downward-sloping thick curve in Figure 1 illustrates the function 	0. The optimal
mass of suppliers is where this curve cuts the horizontal line. An increase of wM
1 leads
to an upward shift, and an increase of  to a downward shift of this horizontal line. For
13given values of wM
1 and H, more productive ﬁrms thus collaborate with more suppliers
since they can easier cope with the requirement to match their outside opportunities. Still,
the complexity choice always remains below N
0, i.e., N is bounded. Furthermore, the 	0-
curve shifts to the left as H increases. Hence, when comparing equally productive ﬁrms
from diﬀerent sectors, those from headquarter-intensive industries have a lower optimal
complexity than those from component-intensive industries.
0
H !

















Figure 2: Distribution of revenue
In Figure 2 we illustrate the corresponding optimal headquarter revenue share. The
ﬁgure ﬁrstly depicts the H
0 -curve for the benchmark case with wM
1 = 0. Since we
know from the ﬁrst-order conditions that @H=@N < 0, it is clear that the H-curve
stretches out to the left if wM
1 > 0. This implies a higher H throughout the range of H:
0 < H
0 < H < 1 with @H=@wM
1 > 0. The reason is that an increase in wM
1 , by re-
ducing the optimal complexity, leads to a higher individual input intensity i = M=N for
each supplier. This raises the suppliers’ incentives and thereby allows for a larger optimal
revenue share H. Yet, this share is lower in ﬁrms with higher productivity, i.e., the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc H-curve moves closer to the H
0 -curve (@H=@ < 0). The intuition is that
more productive ﬁrms are also more complex, and to maintain the investment incentives,
they need to leave a larger share M for the suppliers.9
9A stronger cost saving eﬀect s naturally leads to more suppliers (a higher N) and, thus, to a lower
H. Graphically, the 	0-curve in Figure 1 shifts to the right as s increases. In the corresponding Figure
2, both the H
0 - and the H-curve stretch out to the right. Furthermore, higher productivity implies a
higher total payoﬀ, despite the fact that more productive ﬁrms have more complex production processes
and, thus, higher ﬁxed costs. Higher productivity thus raises the variable payoﬀ stronger than the ﬁxed
costs, as is shown in Appendix A.2.2.ii.
14Summing up, the results for N
0 and H
0 from Proposition 1 thus still apply for N and
H, and with wM
1 > 0 we can additionally state
Proposition 2: Within an industry, more productive ﬁrms (higher ) have a larger opti-
mal mass of suppliers N and a lower optimal revenue share for the headquarter H. The
higher is the suppliers’ outside opportunity wM
1 the lower is N and the higher is H.
3.1.2 The make-or-buy decision under incomplete contracts
We now turn to the incomplete contracts scenario where the producer cannot freely decide
on the division of the surplus. The producer now chooses, separately for each component,
if the respective supplier is an integrated aﬃliate or an external (outsourced) contractor, as
this aﬀects the bargaining power of the involved agents and thereby the revenue division.
In particular, following Grossman and Hart (1986), we show that external suppliers are in
a better bargaining position than integrated suppliers vis-a-vis the producer. This is due
to the fact that the producer has no ownership of the assets of external suppliers, while
she does have residual control rights over the assets of those suppliers that are integrated
within the boundaries of the ﬁrm.
Assume for the moment that a single outsourced supplier receives a revenue share O
while a single integrated supplier receives V, with O 6= V. We will shortly derive
explicit solutions for these revenue shares. This implies that suppliers are now poten-
tially asymmetric along the organizational dimension, despite symmetric input intensities
i = 1=N, unit costs cM = N s, and outside opportunities wM
1 . Using (5) and (6) we can
derive the following input provision level for supplier i:
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It should be recalled that i 2 fO;V g denotes the organizational form of supplier i,
and  2 [0;1] is the outsourcing share of the ﬁrm. For the headquarter input we have






























15The total payoﬀ is  = R cHh N1 s 
 
mO + (1   )mV
 F = 	 NwM
1    f, and






















The producer maximizes the total payoﬀ  with respect to N and , taking into account
that those choices aﬀect the revenue distribution within the ﬁrm via the simultaneous mul-
tilateral bargaining process in the last stage of the game. We now discuss this bargaining
stage where we use the Shapley value as the solution concept. Most formal derivations are
deferred to Appendix A.3.1, but we provide here some basic intuition.
In a bargaining game with a ﬁnite number of players, a player’s Shapley value is the
average of her contributions to all coalitions that consist of players ordered below her in
all feasible permutations. Applying this general reasoning to our model, assume for the
moment that there is a coalition between the headquarter and n  N symmetric suppliers.
We show in Appendix A.3.1. that the joint revenue in this case can be written as






 = (1   
H)=: (17)
Now suppose that one of those supplier drops out of the coalition, so that the new joint
revenue is given by R(n   1). The reduction in the joint revenue is smaller the higher N
is. It is also smaller the lower 
 is, i.e., the higher H or  are. That is, this supplier’s
“marginal contribution” is lower when complexity is high, when headquarter services are
intensively used in production, or when components are easily substitutable. We shall
impose that 
 > 1, i.e., that  < (1 H).10 Economically, we thus restrict our attention
to situations where single suppliers are suﬃciently important, while ruling out those cases
where components are both technologically unimportant and easy to substitute.
The diﬀerence between outsourced and integrated suppliers is that, if one integrated
supplier drops out of a coalition, he cannot threaten to take away the full input provision
level. We rather assume, following Antràs and Helpman (2004), that an internal supplier
can only threaten to take away the fraction  2 (0;1) of his input, while the rest stays with
the producer owing to her residual control rights. An external supplier, on the other hand,
can threaten to take away the entire input level. Following this logic, we derive in Appendix
A.3.1. the asymptotic Shapley value of a single supplier in the case of outsourcing and
10Notice that this parameter restriction on  is stricter in more headquarter-intensive industries. In fact,
in the limit with H ! 1 it requires that we contemplate the Cobb-Douglas case with  ! 0.


















It follows from (18) that every supplier receives a lower revenue share the higher is the
complexity level of the ﬁrm, the higher is the headquarter-intensity, or the better the
component inputs can be substituted. Furthermore, for given values of N, H and , an
outsourced supplier receives a larger revenue share than an integrated aﬃliate (O > V).
Finally, using (18) we can compute the producer’s residual revenue share H() that
can be understood as her eﬀective bargaining power in the multilateral bargaining process:

H () = 1   N
O   (1   )N
V =
1 + 




As is clear from (19), the producer’s share is increasing in the headquarter-intensity H
and in the degree of component substitutability , but it is independent of the complexity
level N. Most importantly, the producer can increase her eﬀective bargaining power by
decreasing the outsourcing share , i.e., by relying more on integrated suppliers. However,
for given parameters 

















To illustrate this available range for the headquarter’s revenue share more speciﬁcally,
consider ﬁrst the extreme case with 
 ! 1 which results when each component is essential
for the production process (if  ! 0). In this case the producer’s Shapley value and, thus,
her realized revenue share is zero if she only chooses external suppliers (H
min = 0), while
she is able to realize at most a share H
max = (1   ) > 0 if she chooses complete vertical
integration. For an intermediate choice of the outsourcing share,  2 (0;1), her realized
share H() is between 0 and (1   ). Now consider the other extreme case with 
 ! 1.
In that case the producer can achieve a share between H
min = 1=2 and H
max = (1   =2).
Notice that those values of H
min and H
max are larger than their counterparts under 
 ! 1,
since the components are now better substitutable so that the suppliers have lower Shapley
values. Finally, for intermediate parameter constellations 
 2 (1;1) the respective H
min(
)
is between 0 and 1=2, and the respective H
max(
;) is between (1   ) and (1   =2),
with @H
min=@
 < 0, @H
max=@
 < 0, and @H
max=@ < 0. Then, given the (exogenous)




;), the producer can achieve a revenue share
H() 2 [H
min;H
max] by the choice of the outsourcing share  2 [0;1]. Figure 2 above
depicts such an intermediate parameter constellation, in which case the H
min– and the
H
max–curves are both upward sloping in fH;Hg–space.11
a) Zero outside opportunity. Having clariﬁed the foundations and the solution of
the multilateral bargaining process in the ultimate stage of the game, we now turn to the
producer’s ﬁrm structure decision in the ﬁrst stage. We start again with the case where
the suppliers’ outside opportunities are set to zero (wM
1 = 0). In this case, the producer’s
problem is to maximize the variable payoﬀ 	 as given by (16) simultaneously with respect
to N and , subject to O and V given in (18) and H() given in (19).
As shown in Appendix A.3.2., solving the ﬁrst-order condition 	0
N = @(	)=@N = 0
yields the following complexity choice for any given outsourcing share  2 [0;1]:












1  (1   ) + 




1  (1   ) + 
 (21)
where H () comes from the constraint (19). Using (21) we show in Appendix A.3.2. that
@ ~ N0=@ > 0, so that ~ NO
0  ~ N0
 










is, a ﬁrm that fully relies on vertical integration is – everything else equal – less complex
than a ﬁrm with outsourced suppliers only, and an increase in the outsourcing share of the
ﬁrm is endogenously associated with an increase in complexity. The intuition is similar as
in Section 3.1.1.: The producer can countervail the more severe underinvestment problem
for integrated suppliers by concentrating on fewer intermediate inputs.
Unfortunately, the other ﬁrst-order condition 	0
 = @ (	)=@jN= ~ N0() = 0 cannot
be solved explicitly for the optimal outsourcing share that we denote by ~ 0. However, it is
possible to infer the key properties of ~ 0 analytically. In particular, we show in Appendix
A.3.2. that @~ 0=@H  0: ﬁrms from more headquarter-intensive industries tend to choose
less outsourcing. The intuition for this result can be illustrated by using Figure 2. Recall
from above that, if the producer were unconstrained in the division of the revenue, she
11Those curves are upward sloping since an increase of H reduces the value of 
 for given  and . Since

 > 1 is always assumed to hold, those curves then have strictly positive slope only up to H
min = 1=2 and
H
max = (1   =2), respectively. Notice further that both curves intersect the H
0 –curve only once. This
single crossing property, which is important for the delineation of component- and headquarter-intensive
industries below, is ensured by the parameter restriction 
 > 1. Both the H
min– and the H
max–curve must
then cut the H
0 –curve from above, since H
0 ! 0 as H ! 0 while H
max > H
min > 0 as H ! 0.
18would choose H
0 as given in (12). In the present context the producer can aﬀect the
revenue distribution only via the choice of  while being constrained according to (18) and
(19). If the ﬁrm operates in a suﬃciently headquarter-intensive sector, we have H
0 > H
max
for given parameter values (, , s and ). Firms from those sectors with H >  H
0 choose
complete vertical integration, ~ 0 = 0, as this leads to the maximum possible revenue share
H
max for the headquarter and thus to the closest possible alignment of H() with H
0 .
The corresponding complexity choice is ~ NV
0 as obtained from (21). Analogously, if the
ﬁrm operates in a suﬃciently component-intensive sector (H <   H
0 ), the producer aims
for the highest possible revenue share for the suppliers by choosing complete outsourcing
(~ 0 = 1), with the corresponding ~ NO
0 .12 Finally, in sectors with medium headquarter-
intensity (  H
0  H   H
0 ) the constraint H
min  H
0  H
max from (19) is not binding. The
producer can therefore set an outsourcing share ~ 0 2 [0;1] so as to realign H(~ 0) closely to
H
0 . This outsourcing share is higher in more component-intensive industries within that
range (@~ 0=@H < 0), since @H
0 =@H > 0 holds as shown above. The complexity level
corresponding to ~ 0 then follows from (21).13 Summing up, we can state
Proposition 3: Firms from more headquarter-intensive industries have less suppliers
(lower ~ N0), and a lower outsourcing share (~ 0). Firms from sectors with medium headquarter-
intensity choose a coexistence of both organizational forms (hybrid sourcing).
These results are illustrated in Figure 3a. Here we assume ﬁxed values of , , s and ,
which pin down the sector thresholds  H
0 and   H
0 , and we depict the total realized payoﬀ
~ 0 =  ~ 	(N = ~ N0; = ~ 0)   f as a function of  and H. A darker color indicates a higher
complexity level ~ N0. Within every sector (i.e., moving parallel to the -axis), we see that
higher productivity implies a higher total payoﬀ. It does not aﬀect the ﬁrms’ complexity
or organization decision as long as the suppliers’ outside opportunities are zero, however,
as those decisions then have no implications for the ﬁrms’ ﬁxed costs. Both complexity
and organization then diﬀer only across but not within sectors. Firms from sectors with
low headquarter-intensity have a huge mass of suppliers ( ~ NO
0 ), all of which are outsourced.
12In Appendix A.3.2. we show that these thresholds  H
0 and   H
0 must exist for given parameter values
of , , s and  where it is always understood that the restriction 
 > 1 (i.e.,  < (1   H)) is satisﬁed.
These thresholds are then such that 0 <   H
0 <  H
0 < 1.
13We can also consider the comparative statics with respect to s and . An increase of s stretches the
H
0 –curve out to the right, but it does not aﬀect the Shapley values and hence the H
min– and the H
max–
curves. The parameter domain where outsourcing is chosen thus becomes larger. Analogously, an increase
of  increases H
min and H
max, but it does not aﬀect H
0 . The parameter domain where outsourcing is
chosen thus also becomes larger.
19Gradually increasing H, we ﬁrst see no change in the ﬁrms’ organizational structures, since
~ 0 = 1 as long as H <   H
0 , but a gradually decreasing mass of suppliers. Once we turn
to sectors with headquarter-intensity above   H
0 there is hybrid sourcing: Firms in those
sectors choose to have some outsourced and some integrated suppliers. The outsourcing
share ~ 0 and the complexity level ~ N0 are both gradually decreasing in H. Finally, once
H goes beyond  H
0 , ﬁrms choose ~ 0 = 0 and ~ NV
0 . Firms in the most headquarter-intensive
sectors are thus the least complex ones, and fully vertically integrated.
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Figure 3: Total ﬁrm payoﬀ, complexity and organization.
b) Positive outside opportunity. We now focus on the case where an increase in
complexity endogenously leads to higher ﬁxed costs (wM
1 > 0). We cannot explicitly solve
for ~ N and ~  that maximize the ﬁrm’s total payoﬀ  =   	   wM
1 N    f in that case, but
similar as in subsection 3.1.1. it is again possible to infer the comparative statics.
First, we can use the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to N to characterize the com-
plexity choice for a given organizational decision as follows: From (13) we know that the
optimal mass of suppliers N is determined according to 	0 = wM
1 = where 	0 is as de-







a similar logic. Using (16), we can deﬁne a function 	0 (N;) that can be represented by a
downward-sloping curve in N, similarly as in Figure 1. This function depicts the marginal
change in the variable payoﬀ when raising complexity, taking the value of  as ﬁxed and sub-
stituting in for H, O and V according to (18) and (19). We show in Appendix A.3.3. that
@	0=@  0, so that 	O0  	0  
N; = 1;H = H
min

> 	V 0  	0  
N; = 0;H = H
max

with the 	0–curves for the intermediate cases with  2 (0;1) in between the 	V 0 and the
	O0–curve. Furthermore, we show that @	0=@H < 0 for any given , i.e., all of those
20curves shift to the left when H is increased. The complexity choice conditional on the
outsourcing share, ~ N(), follows from the ﬁrst-order condition for payoﬀ maximization
	0 = wM
1 =. Graphically, it it thus located at the intersection of the respective downward-
sloping 	0–curve with the horizontal line at wM
1 =. We can state the following results:
Proposition 4: For given levels of H and , higher ﬁrm productivity is associated with
a greater mass of suppliers; this complexity level ~ N() always remains below the respective
~ N0(). For given levels of  and H, a larger outsourcing share is associated with higher
complexity. For given levels of  and , higher headquarter-intensity is associated with
lower complexity.
Turning to the organizational decision, it should be noted that the ﬁrst-order condition
with respect to  does not depend on wM
1 , while the term 0
 = @=@ = @	=@ depends
non-negatively on N.14 Since @ ~ N=@H < 0 and @ ~ N=@ > 0 according to Proposition 4,
the optimum condition 0
 = 0 then immediately implies that @~ =@H  0 and @~ =@  0.
As before, we thus ﬁnd that ﬁrms from more headquarter-intensive industries tend to
choose less outsourcing. Furthermore, with endogenous ﬁxed costs less productive ﬁrms
also tend to choose less outsourcing, since they try to avoid the higher complexity level
that is associated with this organizational structure.
To grasp the intuition for these results, it is again useful to consider that the producer
chooses the optimal outsourcing share ~  in such a way that the resulting revenue share
H(~ ) from (19) is realigned closely with the payoﬀ-maximizing revenue share H. For
given parameters (in particular, the sector-speciﬁc H and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc ), comparing






, every ﬁrm can thus































is binding, and all
ﬁrms in group 1 choose complete vertical integration (~  = 0) while all ﬁrms in group 2
choose complete outsourcing (~  = 1). For ﬁrms in group 3 this constraint is not binding,
and they can choose an outsourcing share ~  so that H(~ ) is close to H. In the previous
case without endogenous ﬁxed costs (wM
1 = 0), it was possible to delineate these three
groups by the sectoral headquarter-intensity alone. With wM
1 > 0 this is no longer possible,




is now ﬁrm-speciﬁc as it depends on .15 In other words, ﬁrms from
the same industry may choose diﬀerent ﬁrm structures when ﬁxed costs matter.
The consequences of endogenous ﬁxed costs for the ﬁnal ﬁrm structure decisions are
illustrated in Figure 3b above. First, consider headquarter-intensive sectors with H >  H
0 .
All ﬁrms from those sectors (regardless of their productivity) belong to group 1, and thus
choose complete vertical integration. This is for two reasons. This organization leads to the
highest possible revenue share for the producer (H
max), which in turn maximizes the variable
payoﬀ. Now this choice is reinforced, since vertical integration is also associated with fewer
suppliers and thus with lower ﬁxed costs. There is, hence, no change in the organizational
decision of ﬁrms in headquarter-intensive industries compared to the previous case with
wM
1 = 0, which is depicted in Figure 3a. Figure 3b also shows that not only the total
payoﬀ ~ , but also the complexity level ~ NV is now increasing in . That is, within a given
headquarter-intensive sector, more productive ﬁrms vertically integrate more suppliers.
Furthermore, comparing two equally productive ﬁrms from two industries A and B with
H
A > H
B >  H
0 , it turns out that the ﬁrm in sector A chooses less complexity than the ﬁrm
in the relatively more component-intensive sector B.
Now consider component-intensive sectors where H <   H
0 . Without the endogenous
“complexity penalty”, all ﬁrms in those sectors would belong to group 2 and choose complete
outsourcing (see Figure 3a). With wM
1 > 0, we observe that some ﬁrms now switch to
group 1 and thus choose complete vertical integration in order to keep ﬁxed costs low.
This switch is more likely: i) the lower productivity is, since the increase of H is then
most substantial, and ii) the closer H is to the upper bound   H
0 , since the H can then
easier exceed H
max. There are also ﬁrms whose H increases by less, so that it now falls
inside the range between H
min and H
max. Those ﬁrms then belong to group 3 and now
choose hybrid sourcing (0 < ~  < 1). This is more likely to occur for ﬁrms with medium
productivity, and in sectors with headquarter-intensity not too close to the upper bound
  H
0 . For ﬁrms with high productivity, the increase of H due to wM
1 > 0 is negligible, and
they remain in group 2 and continue to choose complete outsourcing. Intuitively, the higher
ﬁxed cost under outsourcing play a minor role for these highly productive ﬁrms; their main
aim is to maximize the residual rights of the suppliers whose inputs are intensively used.
Similarly, ﬁrms from highly component-intensive sectors are also more likely to remain
in group 2, i.e., to choose complete outsourcing. Summing up, the organization of ﬁrms
in component-intensive industries now varies over the range of . Low productive ﬁrms
15Recall from Figure 2 that the H-curve stretches out to the left when wM
1 > 0, and that this increase
of H compared to the benchmark H
0 is larger for less productive ﬁrms.
22have few suppliers which are fully vertically integrated. With rising productivity, there is
a gradual increase of complexity ~ N and the outsourcing share ~ , and the most productive
ﬁrms collaborate with a huge mass of suppliers all of which are outsourced.16
Finally, the organizational decision of ﬁrms from sectors with   H
0  H   H
0 is now also
tilted towards more vertical integration. More precisely, all ﬁrms decrease their outsourcing
share in response to an increase of wM
1 . Firms with low productivity see a larger increase
in H, so they are more likely to become constrained by H
max and thus choose ~  = 0.
This switch from group 3 to group 1 is also more likely to happen in sectors where H is
only slightly below  H, since the outsourcing share was already low there. Firms with high
productivity and with headquarter-intensity relatively close to   H are, in contrast, more
likely to continue to choose hybrid sourcing. Yet, since H has increased, this necessarily
implies a lower outsourcing share even for those ﬁrms.17 Overall, Figure 3b suggests that
the coexistence of integration and outsourcing is most pervasive in ﬁrms with medium-to-
high productivity in sectors with low-to-medium headquarter-intensity.
3.2 Open Economy
We now incorporate the global scale dimension into the producer’s problem, who now also
decides on the country r 2 f1;2g where each component i 2 [0;N] is manufactured. We
assume that unit costs of foreign suppliers are lower than for domestic suppliers, namely
cM
2 =   cM
1 where  2 (0;1) reﬂects the cross-country cost diﬀerence. Recalling that unit
costs of domestic suppliers are given by cM
1 = N s we thus have cM
2 =   N s.
3.2.1 Optimal mass of suppliers, revenue division, and oﬀshoring share
As in the closed economy case, we ﬁrst analyze the scenario where the producer can freely
assign the revenue distribution. Due to symmetry, all domestic input suppliers receive
16Antràs and Helpman (2004) obtain the opposite result, namely that headquarter-intensive sectors
are those where organizational structures are diﬀerent across the productivity spectrum. That result
is driven by the ad-hoc assumption that integration is associated with exogenously higher ﬁxed costs
than outsourcing. Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2005) consider the alternative ad-hoc assumption that
outsourcing is associated with exogenously higher ﬁxed costs. Our model is qualitatively more consistent
with the latter, but it is important to note that in our model ﬁxed cost diﬀerences between organizational
modes emerge endogenously as they imply diﬀerent optimal complexity levels. We could generate a similar
sourcing pattern as in Antràs and Helpman (2004) when assuming that  f is suﬃciently higher under
integration than under outsourcing. We refrain from doing so, however, as the consequences of such an
ad-hoc assumption are well understood.
17If an increase of wM
1 overall leads to more or less hybrid sourcing is unclear, since there is exit from
group 3 to group 1 but also entry from group 2 to group 3.
23an equal revenue share that we denote by 1. Analogously, since all foreign suppliers are
also symmetric, each of them receives a revenue share 2. Let 2 = 1. The parameter
 reﬂects the revenue division within the group of input suppliers, to be chosen by the
producer. With  > 1 a foreign low-cost suppliers receives a larger revenue share than a
domestic high-cost supplier, and vice versa for  < 1. Using (5), it then follows that the
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(1 )
 Ropen and m2 = (=)
1=(1 ) m1; (22)
where we impose  >  so that m2 > m1. Since
 
1   H
=N = (1 `)1 +`2 must hold,
and since hopen = (HH=cH)Ropen, the ﬁrm’s total revenue is given by































where Rclosed is the expression for total revenue from the closed economy case as given in
(9). The variable payoﬀ is 	open = Ropen   cHhopen + (1   `)Nc1m1 + `Nc1m2, where
m1 and m2 are given by (22), and it can be written as


















When the outside opportunity in both countries is equal to zero (wM
1 = wM
2 = 0),
the producer’s problem is equivalent to maximizing the ﬁrm’s variable payoﬀ as given in
(23) simultaneously with respect to N, H, ` and . We show in Appendix B.1.i that the











0 = 1: (24)
That is, with zero outside opportunities, the ﬁrm would choose the same complexity level
and revenue distribution as in the closed economy, which are given in (11) and (12). Fur-
thermore, the ﬁrm would fully oﬀshore all components to the foreign country. This is
intuitive, because oﬀshoring only has advantages (lower unit costs of foreign suppliers) but
24no disadvantages when endogenous ﬁxed costs play no role.18 Given those optimal choices,






Now suppose that wM
1 = wM
2 > 0, i.e., endogenous ﬁxed costs matter but there are no
cross-country diﬀerences in the “complexity penalty”. In that case, the producer maximizes
open = 	open   wM
2 N. Since the ﬁxed cost term does not depend on the oﬀshoring
share, it is easy to see that the ﬁrm would still oﬀshore all components, since it still has
no disadvantages to choose foreign component manufacturing. Put diﬀerently, the ﬁrm
chooses ` = 1 as this maximizes the variable payoﬀ 	open as shown before.
To determine N
open and H
open for the case with wM
1 = wM
2 > 0, we can adopt the same
solution approach as in the closed economy. That is, we can solve the ﬁrst-order condi-
tion @open=@H = 0 for H(N) and substitute this into the other ﬁrst-order condition
@open=@N = 0 to derive a function 	0
open that depends negatively on N. With ` = 1, it is






closed. The optimal complexity is determined ac-
cording to 	0
open = wM
2 =. Comparing the structure of ﬁrms within and across industries
in the open economy, the results spelled out in Propositions 1 and 2 therefore still hold.
In particular, more productive ﬁrms and ﬁrms from more component-intensive industries
have more suppliers and a lower headquarter revenue share. Yet more importantly, with
the above condition we can also compare the structure of the same ﬁrm in the open and
in the closed economy. This corresponds to the standard thought experiment where an
economy opens up to trade, which in our context means that we move from an autarky
scenario with domestic suppliers only (as described in Section 3.1.1.) to the present sce-
nario where oﬀshoring to a foreign low-cost country is feasible. Since 	0
open > 	0
closed for
given parameters , H, s, and wM
1 = wM





closed. We can thus state
Proposition 5: Provided that wM
1 = wM
2 > 0, all ﬁrms increase their complexity level and
decrease their headquarter revenue share when the economy opens up to trade.
What is the intuition for this result? Recall that the optimal complexity level is de-
termined in a trade-oﬀ with the cost saving eﬀect on the one side, and the dilution eﬀect
and the ﬁxed cost increase on the other side. Since N
0;open = N
0;closed with zero outside
opportunities, we know that the balance between the cost saving and the dilution eﬀect is
18Notice that the choice of  becomes immaterial with ` = 1, as there is then no asymmetry across
suppliers in equilibrium. All suppliers are foreign and receive the same share 
2 = (1   H
0;open)=N
0;open.
25unaﬀected by the lower unit costs of the foreign suppliers, although the absolute magnitude
of both eﬀects is ampliﬁed. When the ﬁxed cost channel matters, this implies higher costs
of adding complexity (so that N
open < N
0;open), but in relative terms those costs increase
by less than in the closed economy (so that N
open > N
closed) since the ﬁxed cost eﬀect is
not ampliﬁed. Economically, this result implies that globalization boosts the slicing of the
production process, i.e., ﬁrms collaborate with more suppliers than under autarky.
Finally, we consider the case where oﬀshoring has both advantages and disadvantages
for the ﬁrm. In fact, as is widely known, oﬀshoring often leads to higher communication
and transportation costs, more expensive managerial oversight, and so on. To take this into
account, we may assume that there is an extra ﬁxed cost fX > 0 per oﬀshored component,
capturing those higher transaction costs for the ﬁrm. Overall ﬁxed cost are then given by
wM
1  (1   `)N + (wM
2 + fX)  `N +  f, and we assume that   wM
2 + fX   wM
1 > 0 which
allows us to rewrite ﬁxed costs as (wM
1 +`)N+  f.19 When it comes to the maximization of
the total payoﬀ, which now reads as open = 	open (wM
1 +`)N    f , there is henceforth
a trade-oﬀ: oﬀshoring generates a higher variable payoﬀ, but also larger ﬁxed costs.
Due to this trade-oﬀ, it may therefore be optimal for a ﬁrm to oﬀshore only some but
not all components, in which case it would collaborate both with high-cost (domestic) and
with low-cost (foreign) suppliers. This raises the issue how to divide the revenue among
these asymmetric component manufacturers, i.e., how to choose  optimally given the
choices of `, N and H. For the case of a unit elasticity of substitution across components
( ! 0), it is possible to show analytically that the producer would always set  = 1, i.e.,
she would divide the joint revenue share M = 1   H equally among all suppliers (see
Appendix B.2.). Furthermore, for that case we can formally show that @`=@  0 and
@`=@H  0, with strict inequalities if 0 < ` < 1. In the more general case with  > 0,
we cannot solve analytically but only numerically for the optimal . These numerical
simulations then suggest, in particular, that the comparative static results for ` with
respect to  and H remain robust. We hence state:
Proposition 6: Within every sector, more productive ﬁrms have a higher optimal oﬀ-
shoring share. For a given productivity level, the optimal oﬀshoring share is lower in more
headquarter-intensive industries.
The intuition for these results is straightforward: The positive eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the
variable payoﬀ is multiplied by the ﬁrm’s productivity level, while the ﬁxed cost increase
19Suppliers from country 1 may have a higher outside opportunity than those from the poor country 2.
Assuming  > 0 ensures that the oﬀshoring cost fX outweighs the diﬀerence in outside opportunities.
26does not depend on . Suﬃciently highly productive ﬁrms therefore still set ` = 1, as
they are relatively little aﬀected by the higher oﬀshoring ﬁxed costs (particularly if  is
not too large). Firms with suﬃciently low productivity solely rely on domestic suppliers
(` = 0) in order to keep ﬁxed costs low. Partial oﬀshoring (0 < ` < 1) is chosen by
ﬁrms with intermediate productivity. Furthermore, ﬁrms from more headquarter-intensive
industries tend to oﬀshore less, since they choose lower complexity levels and thus beneﬁt
relatively less from lower unit costs of their (fewer) suppliers.
3.2.2 The make-or-buy decision under incomplete contracts
Turning now to the incomplete contracts environment where the producer cannot freely
decide on the revenue distribution, ﬁrst suppose that ﬁxed cost considerations play no role
at all (i.e., wM
1 = wM
2 = fX = 0). In that case, the producer would oﬀshore all components
(~ `O
0 = ~ `V
0 = 1) while making the same complexity and organization decisions as in the closed
economy (see Figure 3a).20 That is, with H <   H
0 ﬁrms would completely rely on arm’s
length transactions, with H >  H
0 on intra-ﬁrm trade, and with   H
0  H   H
0 on a
combination of the two sourcing modes (“hybrid global sourcing”).
Similarly, with wM
1 = wM
2 > 0 and fX = 0, all ﬁrms would have foreign suppliers
only. Comparing the complexity and organization decisions across ﬁrms and industries, a
similar pattern as in Figure 3b applies. Moreover, it can again be shown that all ﬁrms raise
their complexity level when the economy opens up to trade, as stated in Proposition 5.
Furthermore, since ~ Nopen > ~ Nclosed, the ﬁrm’s optimal headquarter revenue share decreases
while the producer’s eﬀective bargaining power (19) remains constant. This, in turn,
implies that ~ open  ~ closed (also see Appendix B.3.). In other words, we have
Proposition 7: Provided that wM
1 = wM
2 > 0 and fX = 0, no ﬁrm decreases and some
ﬁrms increase the outsourcing share when the economy opens up to trade.
Economically, this implies that the possibility to engage in oﬀshoring is positively cor-
related with outsourcing. Notice that this “time series” correlation (identical ﬁrms tend to
choose more outsourcing after the economy has opened up to trade) is consistent with a
“cross-sectional” pattern as shown in Figure 3b, where many low productive ﬁrms choose
vertical integration in order to keep ﬁxed costs low.
20This follows from the facts that: i) N
0 and H
0 are the same as in the closed economy, and ii) that
the Shapley values in (18) do not depend on the suppliers’ costs. Hence there is also no change in the








1 > 0 and  > 0 we again have the trade-oﬀ between higher ﬁxed
costs and higher variable payoﬀs under oﬀshoring. The higher  is, the more important is
the latter aspect, hence productivity and oﬀshoring are positively related, i.e., @~ `=@  0.
Summing up, the overall sourcing pattern in the open economy can be described as follows:
1. Headquarter-intensive industries: All ﬁrms choose complete vertical integration. The
least productive ﬁrms collaborate with few suppliers and only source domestically. As
productivity rises, ﬁrms gradually increase complexity and the oﬀshoring share. The
most productive ﬁrms collaborate with a huge mass of integrated foreign suppliers.
2. Component-intensive industries: The least productive ﬁrms have few suppliers, all of
which are domestic and vertically integrated. As productivity increases, ﬁrms tend
to increase complexity, the outsourcing share, and the oﬀshoring share. The most
productive ﬁrms collaborate with a huge mass of external foreign suppliers.
3. Industries with medium headquarter-intensity: Low productive ﬁrms collaborate with
few suppliers and tend to choose vertical integration and domestic sourcing. Highly
productive ﬁrms have many suppliers and completely rely on foreign suppliers; they
choose a combination of foreign outsourcing and intra-ﬁrm trade (“hybrid global sourc-
ing”). For a given headquarter-intensity, increasing productivity is associated with
higher complexity, more outsourcing and more oﬀshoring.
4 Asymmetric components
In this last step of the analysis we consider a discrete setting with two asymmetric suppliers,
which we denote by a and b.21 We focus on the organizational decision in this last part of
the paper, which can be written as a tuple  that can take four possible realizations:22
 2 ffO;Og;fO;V g;fV;Og;fV;V gg;
where the ﬁrst (second) element depicts whether the supplier of input a (input b) is out-
sourced or vertically integrated.
21It is straightforward to consider a discrete version of our model by dividing the range [0;N] into X
equally spaced subintervals, where all inputs in each subinterval N=X are performed by a single supplier.
22We abstract from the complexity and the global scale decision. Complexity is now exogenously given
by N = 2, so that we also neglect the cost saving eﬀect s. We also do not consider the oﬀshoring decision
of the producer. However, we do allow for exogenous marginal cost diﬀerences across the two suppliers, so
that the low-cost (high-cost) supplier may be considered as foreign (domestic).
28The two suppliers can diﬀer exogenously along three dimensions: i) with respect to the
input intensities M  i for i = a;b (with a + b = 1), which measure the technological
importance of the respective input for the production process, ii) with respect to marginal
costs cM
i for i = a;b, and iii) with respect to the “thread points” i for i = a;b under vertical
integration, i.e., with respect to shares that they threaten to take away in the bargaining
process. We believe that this latter asymmetry is a useful measure for the sophistication
or knowledge speciﬁcity of the respective input, because it captures how well the producer
can deal with the leftovers of the input when the (vertically integrated) supplier i refuses
to collaborate. If the input is diﬃcult (easy) to handle, we expect i to be high (low). Both
suppliers a and b still threaten to take away their entire input provision levels if they are
external subcontractors, since they maintain asset ownership in that case.
The organizational decision  = fa;bg 2 , together with the exogenously given
asymmetries, determine the Shapley values of the suppliers and hence their revenue shares
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In Appendix C we show how the Shapley values can be computed numerically. We ﬁnd
that, everything else equal, the Shapley value of supplier i and hence his revenue share 

i
is: i) higher if he is outsourced than if he is vertically integrated, ii) increasing in the input
intensity Mi, iii) decreasing in the unit costs cM
i , and iv) increasing in the “thread” point
i. Intuitively, in all cases supplier i has a higher bargaining power because his marginal
contribution to every possible coalition increases.
We now discuss the payoﬀ maximizing organizational decision. First, we consider the
simplest case where the components a and b diﬀer only in their input intensities, while the
suppliers have identical unit costs and thread points (cM
a = cM
b and a = b). In Figure 4a,
we depict the headquarter-intensity of production on the horizontal and the technological
asymmetry across components on the vertical axis (with a = 1=2 we have symmetrical
29inputs). The diﬀerent colors indicate which organizational mode is payoﬀ-maximizing. As
the graph shows, the producer would vertically integrate (outsource) both suppliers for
suﬃciently high (low) values of H. Hybrid sourcing (one integrated and one outsourced
supplier) is chosen in sectors with intermediate headquarter-intensity, and within this range
the producer tends to choose fO;V g if a > 1=2 and fV;Og if a < 1=2. That is, under
hybrid sourcing, she tends to outsource the technologically “more important” component
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Figure 4: Organizational decision with two asymmetric components
Now suppose that the components diﬀer in their input intensities and unit costs, while
the thread points are still identical (a = b). We assume that cM
a > cM
b , i.e., supplier a
is the high-cost type. The impact of this cost asymmetry on the ﬁrm structure decision
is illustrated in Figure 4b. As before, we ﬁnd that the producer chooses outsourcing
(vertical integration) of both suppliers if headquarter-intensity is suﬃciently low (high).
Yet, for intermediate values of H where hybrid sourcing is chosen, we now see that the
choice fV;Og becomes more prevalent. That is, given that there is hybrid sourcing, the
cost asymmetry favors vertical integration of the high-cost and outsourcing of the low-cost
supplier.23 This is due to the fact that the low-cost supplier b contributes a lot and is,
thus, highly valuable to the ﬁrm. The producer therefore outsources supplier b more easily,
as it is relatively more important to incentivize this supplier. Notice, however, that there
23This can be seen by comparing the ﬁrm structure decisions for values of H close to 1=2 and a slightly
above 1=2 in Figure 4. Without the cost asymmetry (Figure 4a) the producer chooses fO;V g, and with
the cost asymmetry (Figure 4b) she chooses fV;Og.
30is still a range in Figure 4b where the producer chooses fO;V g, namely if a is suﬃciently
large. In that case, it becomes relatively more important to incentivize the supplier of the
technologically highly important input a, rather than the low-cost supplier b.
A qualitatively similar picture as in Figure 4b emerges in the case where compo-
nents/suppliers diﬀer in their input intensities and thread points, while now assuming
that unit costs are the same (cM
a = cM
b ). Speciﬁcally, we assume that a > b. Input a can
then be thought of as the “sophisticated” component that requires more speciﬁc knowledge
to be usable by the producer when the supplier refuses to collaborate. As Figure 4b shows,
given that we are in the intermediate range of H where hybrid sourcing is chosen, and
given that a is not too large, the producer indeed vertically integrates the sophisticated
input a and outsources the simple input b. The intuition is that the headquarter can
relatively easily incentivize supplier a even as an integrated aﬃliate, because the supplier
still threatens to take away a large share if the coalition breaks down. For supplier b it is
relatively more diﬃcult to be incentivized within the boundaries of the ﬁrm, so that out-
sourcing of that supplier is a more eﬀective device to reduce the underinvestment problem.
Summing up, we infer the following Proposition from Figure 4:
Proposition 8: Suppose there are two asymmetric components a and b. If headquarter-
intensity H is suﬃciently low (high), the producer outsources (vertically integrates) both
suppliers. For intermediate headquarter-intensity, the producer outsources one and verti-
cally integrates the other supplier (hybrid sourcing). Given that the producer chooses hybrid
sourcing, she tends to outsource the component with the higher input intensity i and the
lower unit costs cM
i . She tends to vertically integrate the supplier who has the higher thread
point i, i.e., the supplier of the “more sophisticated” input.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a theory of a ﬁrm which decides on the complexity, the
organization, and the global scale of its production process. Our model leads to several
novel predictions about the structure of multinational ﬁrms that are consistent with styl-
ized facts from the recent empirical literature. For example, studies by Jabbour (2008),
Jabbour and Kneller (2010), and Kohler and Smolka (2009) show that MNEs, in prac-
tice, are characterized by multiple suppliers and a variety of diﬀerent sourcing modes. In
particular, Tomiura (2007) shows that ﬁrms which rely on a mixture of aﬃliates and ex-
ternal contractors (i.e., on hybrid sourcing) tend to be more productive than ﬁrms which
31rely on a single sourcing mode in the global economy. This ﬁnding is consistent with our
framework for the case of intermediate headquarter-intensity, which is likely to encapsulate
many industries in the data. Our model version with two asymmetric inputs may provide a
rationale for the empirical ﬁndings by Alfaro and Charlton (2009) and Corcos et al. (2009),
that ﬁrms tend to keep high-skill inputs or components with a higher degree of speciﬁcity
within their boundaries. Our model may also motivate future empirical research, as it leads
to several predictions that have – to the best of our knowledge – not been confronted with
data yet. For example, it would be interesting to explore if trade integration has indeed
led to a stronger slicing of the production process, or if (conditional on productivity) ﬁrms
from headquarter-intensive industries systematically have fewer suppliers than ﬁrms from
component-intensive sectors.
The model in this paper is about single ﬁrms. It could potentially be embedded into
a general equilibrium framework where ﬁrm interactions within and across industries are
taken into account. Such a framework would be useful to explore more fully the repercus-
sions of trade integration with cross-country diﬀerences in market conditions, factor prices
and incomes, as well as their implications for global sourcing decisions. Furthermore, our
model is based on a static bargaining scenario. In practice, suppliers may care about long-
term relationships, or may try to collude with other suppliers in order to induce pressure
on the headquarter. Exploring those and other extensions is left for future research.
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34Appendix A: Closed Economy
To simplify notation, we denote the ﬁrst-order partial derivative of a function f with respect to x
as f0
x. Analogously, the second-order partial derivative with respect to y is denoted by f00
xy.
A.1. Input provision.
Supplier i 2 [0;N] chooses the level of input provision mi so as to maximize i = iR   cM
i mi.
Using (3) and (4), the ﬁrst-order-condition (FOC) for the maximization problem of supplier i can
be written as follows:
0
mi = i  R0
mi   cM
















Using (5) for mi and (6) for R yields 0
mi = 0. It remains to be shown that the second-order-
condition (SOC) is satisﬁed:
00





























Analogously, it can be shown that h =   H  H  R=cH maximizes the producer payoﬀ
H = HR   cHh.
A.2. Complexity and revenue division.
A.2.1. Zero outside opportunity.
i.) Maximization problem: The FOCs are given by 0
N = 	0
N = 0 and 0
H = 	0
H = 0. Using
(10), the terms 	0
N and 0
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M[MM N (1   HH)]
(28)
respectively. With eqs. (27) and (28) it is straightforward to show that N
0 and H
0 as given in



















and it can be shown that for the ﬁrst diagonal element 	00
NN < 0 holds while for the determinant
j j > 0. Hence, the matrix   is negative deﬁnite.



























. It can be veriﬁed that
0
i0H > 0 for H < H
crit and 0
i0H < 0 for H > H
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which is decreasing in s. Hence, 
i0 is hump-shaped over the range of H.
iii.) Antràs and Helpman (2004): We claim in footnote 8 that there exists a scrit such that
N








(1   (1   H))(1   H)(1   H)

;
and it can be veriﬁed that H
0 (s = scrit) is identical to eq. (10) in Antràs and Helpman (2004):
H
0 (s = scrit) =
H  




H (1   H)(1   H)(H + 1   )
2H   1
:
A.2.2. Positive outside opportunity.
i.) Maximization problem: The FOCs are given by 0
N = 	0
N   wM
1 = 0 and 0
H = 	0
H = 0.
We can solve 	0
H = 0 for
H (N) =
N   1 + (1 + N)(1   )H + (1 + N)
 
H2   ^ 




(1   H)(1   H)

(1   N)





Note that H (N) as stated in (29) does not depend on wM
1 . Furthermore, it directly follows
that H0
N < 0. Using H (N) in 	0
N = 0 allows us to derive the condition (13), which uniquely
determines N. It then directly follows from Appendix A.2.1.i, and from the fact that 	00
NN < 0
in the relevant domain, that N solves the ﬁrst-order conditions. This N is then associated with
an optimal headquarter revenue share H = H(N = N) from (29) that solves 	0
H = 0.
ii.) Total proﬁts: The optimal mass of suppliers is implicitly given by 0
N = 	0
N   wM
1 = 0. It
then directly follows that 0







= 	 > 0.
A.3. The make-or-buy decision under incomplete contracts.
A.3.1. Shapley Value.
Remark: In the text we assume a continuum of intermediate inputs and each intermediate input
is provided by a separate input supplier. In the following we derive the discrete Shapley value
for the case of M suppliers, each controlling a range  = N=M of the continuum of intermediate
inputs. Similar to Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2007) we then transform the Shapley value
with a ﬁnite number of players into the asymptotic Shapley value by assuming that each supplier’s
controlled range of inputs becomes inﬁnitesimally small ( ! 0).
Step 1: Marginal contribution of a supplier. To compute the Shapley value for a component
supplier j, we need to determine the marginal contribution of this supplier to a given coalition size.
36Consider a situation in which n suppliers contribute inputs equal to m and the ﬁrm contributes
h as given by (8). The joint revenue of coalition size n is given by



























where R is given by (9). Note that in the bargaining stage H, M, i = 1=N and cM are already
determined. The marginal contribution of supplier j is the increase in revenue if the supplier is
part of the coalition versus and if he is not part of the coalition. It is also important to note that
the ﬁrm must be part in any coalition, otherwise the joint revenue is zero. For a given N and





   (n   1)

]: (30)
Step 2: Average over all coalitions. Along the lines of Acemoglu et al. (2007) we consider a
bargaining game with the ﬁrm and n suppliers such that n + 1 players bargain over the surplus
value. We denote a permutation where player 0 is the headquarter and players 1;2;:::;n are the
suppliers by g = fg (0);g (1);:::;g (n)g. The set of feasible permutation is given by G. Now let
z
j
g = fj0jg (j) > g (j0)g be the set of players ordered below j in the permutation of g. Finally, the
joint surplus of the coalition consisting of any subset of the n + 1 players is given by v : G ! R.


















Step 3: Permutations. The probability that g (j) = i is 1=(M + 1) for every i. However, if the
supplier is the ﬁrst g(j) = 0 player in a permutation the ﬁrm is necessarily ordered after j. In this
case the marginal contribution of the supplier j is zero. If g (j) = 1 then the ﬁrm is ordered before
j with probability 1=M and after j with probability 1 1=M. If the ﬁrm is ordered after supplier
j it follows v(z
j
g [ j) = 0 while v(z
j
g [ j) = R(1;N) if the ﬁrm is ordered before. Therefore, for
g (j) = 1 the conditional expected value of v(z
j
g [j) is given by (1=M)R(1;N). Similar, for v(z
j
g)
the conditional expected value is given by (1=M)R(0;N). Repeating this argument for g(j) = i
with i > 1, the conditional expected value of v(z
j
g[j) is given (1=M)R(i;N) while the conditional
expected value of v(z
j


























   (i   )

]:
Using the ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion of i
















































Step 5: Outsourcing vs. integration. We denote O as the revenue share of an outsourced supplier.
This is the case since we assume in (30) that the supplier j contributes m in terms of input
provision. If all suppliers are outsourced ( = 1), the ﬁrm’s revenue share is the residual and
given by H ( = 1) = 1   NO = 1
1+
: In the case of vertical integration the supplier can
only threaten to take away m with 0 <  < 1. Using this assumption, the expression in (30)
is given by R (n;N) = R  [n
   (n   )

]=N
 and the Shapley value of supplier j can be





   (i   )

]: Again, using a ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion,
i.e. i














A.3.2. Zero outside opportunity.
i.) Complexity: We claim that solving 	0
N = @	=@N = 0 leads to ~ N0 () as given by (21). To
derive ~ N0 () consider 	0










1  (1   ) + 







1  (1   )
2 +  (1   )   

1  (1   ) + 2

:
Solving for N and simplifying yields ~ N0 (). Comparing the extreme cases  = 1 and  = 0 reveals
~ N0 ( = 1) > ~ N0 ( = 0). Since H0




















(1   s(1   H)   H)





1  (1   ) + 
2
(    (1   ))
2
> 0:
ii.) Outsourcing share: Ideally we would solve @(	)=@jN= ~ N0() = 0 for ~ 0 in explicit form.
Unfortunately, this is not possible. We thus use an indirect approach to show that @~ 0=@H < 0.
To illustrate this approach, consider the case of 
 ! 1 ,  ! 0. Solving 	0
jN= ~ N0() = 0 for 
38is then equivalent to solving the following equation:
LHS 





(1   H)(1   (1   )H (1   ))
+
H
(1   H)(1   )
+
(1   s)(1   )
 +  (1   )
= ln[]  RHS
Note that the RHS is independent of H and . For a given H, the LHS cuts the RHS uniquely
from below at some  = ~ 0. Furthermore, @LHS=@H > 0. Hence, @~ 0=@H < 0. For 0 <  < 1
(i.e., for 
 > 1) this indirect approach can be repeated, but it now involves extensive expressions.
However, numerical simulations reveal that the same comparative static result holds.
iii.) Sector cutoﬀs: In the following we show that there exist two thresholds  H and   H (with
0 <   H <  H < 1) such that ﬁrms from sectors with  H > H >   H choose ~ 0 2 (0;1) with
@~ 0=@H < 0, ﬁrms with H <   H choose ~ 0 = 1, and ﬁrms with H >  H choose (~ 0 = 0).
To see this, consider 	 for  = 0 and  = 1 at the boundaries H ! 0 and H ! 1, given the
corresponding ~ N0. For the most component-intensive sector with H ! 0 we have:

















while for H ! 1 we have:














since ; 2 (0;1). This comparison together with the continuity of 	 in H implies, that the
aformentioned cutoﬀs   H and  H must exist such that 0 <   H <  H < 1.
A.3.3. Positive outside opportunity.
We cannot solve 0
N = 	0






















which implies that: i.) ~ Nw1 < 0, ii.) ~ N > 0, and iii.) ~ N ! ~ N0 as  ! 1. Next, we have
@	0
N











which implies iv.) ~ NH < 0. For  = 0 and  = 1 with H = H













(1   H)(1   HH)
< 0
Hence, v.) ~ NH < 0. This implies 	O0
> 	V 0















39which yields vi.) @	
0
N=@ > 0 for  2 (0;1) and 	O0
> 	0
> 	V 0
. For 0 <  < 1 (i.e., for

 > 1) the involved expressions become extensive, but numerical simulations reveal that the same
comparative static results hold.
Appendix B: Open Economy
B.1. Optimal mass of suppliers, revenue division and oﬀshoring share
i.) Zero outside opportunities: The ﬁrst two FOCs are given by 0
open;N = 	0
open;N = 0 and
0
open;H = 	0











1   sM   H


















(1   )HM[MMC N (1   HH)]
(33)
Solving (32) and (33) yields N
0;open = C N
0;closed and H
0;open = H
0;closed. Next, we consider the
optimal oﬀshoring share `. Using N
0;open and H
0;open the variable payoﬀ 	open can be written





















(1   ` + `)
s















Notice that 	 (` = 0) = 1 < 	 (` = 1) = (1=)
(1 H)
(1 ) . Hence, the variable payoﬀ is higher
with ` = 1 than with ` = 0. Furthermore, it can be shown that 	 (0 < ` < 1) is never above
	 (` = 1). This can be most easily seen if  = 1, because in that case we have
@	
@`







(1 ) > 0; (35)
but also in all other cases we ﬁnd that ` = 1 maximizes 	 (`). This implies `
0 = 1. Noting that
C (` = 1) = 1, it follows that N
0;open = N
0;closed.
ii.) Equal outside opportunities. With wM
1 = wM
2 > 0, solving @open=@H = 0 for H yields
H (N) =
N   C   (1   )(N + C)H(N + C)H2
+ ^ open




(1   H)(1   H)(N   C)
2   (N + C)(N (   3) + (1 + )C)H + (N + C)
2 H2
2(N + C)H   2C
:
The expression in (36) reduces to the H (N) as given by (29) if ` = 1, since this implies C = 1.
Furthermore ` = 1 also implies R (` = 1) = 	 (` = 1) = (1=)
(1 H)
(1 ) > 1. Using this, it follows
that:
@(	0;open)




40B.2. Asymmetric outside opportunities.
Assume that wM
1 > 0 and  > 0. We know from Appendix B.1. that we can solve 0
H =
	0

































(1   `)`(1   )
(1   )(1   ` + `)

which implies that the FOC is solved by  = 1. This simpliﬁes the analysis as it implies
C = 1 and @	=@` > 0, see (35). Note that independently of this assumption we still have
	 (` = 0) < 	 (` = 1), see Appendix B.1. Substituting H (N) as given by (36) and  = 1























For suﬃciently productive ﬁrms we have 0
` > 0 for all ` 2 [0;1], since 	0
` > 0 and N
open approaches
N
open;0 and is bounded from above. Hence, the global maximum is given by ` = 1. Vice versa,
for ﬁrms with suﬃciently low productivity, 0
` < 0 and hence ` = 0. Finally, we use the implicit
function theorem to derive the comparative statics (to alleviate notation we drop the subscript




















which is negative deﬁnite since 	00















































B.3. The make-or-buy decision under incomplete contracts.
With wM
1 = wM
2 > 0 we have ~ ` = 1 and thus C = 1. The variable payoﬀ can be written
as 	open = R	closed, and using the approach as in Appendix A.3.3 with 
 ! 1, we have
@	0
N;open
@ jN= ~ N0 = R 
@	0
N;closed
@ jN= ~ N0 > 0: Since R > 1 is independent of , it follows that
~ Nopen > ~ Nclosed which implies ~ open  ~ closed.
41Appendix C: Asymmetric components
In the following we provide an algorithm for the derivation of the discrete Shapley values in case
of two asymmetric suppliers.
Step 1: Marginal contribution of a supplier: The coalition size is either n = 2 (headquarter and
one supplier) or n = 3 (producer and both suppliers a and b). A coalition that does not contain
the producer earns zero total revenue. Note that with n = 3 the marginal contribution of supplier
i also depends on the other supplier’s organizational form. For the diﬀerent coalition sizes n = 2
and n = 3 and organizational forms we can derive the following marginal contributions of supplier
a (those for supplier b are analogous):
MCfO;bg






































































































with ^ H  
 
1   H (1 H)  
h=HH
.
Step 2: Average over all coalitions. For both coalition sizes there exist six permutations. For
n = 2 the probability that player a is ordered after the headquarter is given by 1=6. For n = 3
the probablity that player a is ordered after the headquarter and supplier b is 1=3. Hence, for a










a (n = 3): (37)
Step 3: Outsourcing vs. integration. As is clear from (37), the Shapley values depend on the
input contributions which themselves depend on the normalized Shapley values via the revenue
shares. This yields a system of equations that cannot be solved in closed form. However, using the
implicit condition given by (37) we can conduct numerical simulations. Upon request we provide
a mathematica ﬁle with the an algorithm to conduct those numerical simulations.
42